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 Noncitizen voting and 
the extraconstitutional 
construction of the polity 
 Cristina M.  Rodríguez * 
 The core substantive principle of democracy is that those subject to the law should have a voice 
in its formulation — a principle of consent realized primarily through the mechanism of the 
vote. Yet the populations of few (if any) nation-states consist solely of formal citizens; migra-
tion and transnational practices give rise to populations within states bound by laws over which 
they have no direct control. In this essay, I consider a practice that can help address this poten-
tial democracy defi cit — alien suffrage. I focus on three jurisdictions that have adopted some 
form of noncitizen voting in their histories — the United States, New Zealand, and Ireland —
 and consider how their practices refl ect on the processes by which constitutional democracies 
construct their polities. Alien suffrage is not inconsistent with a sense of national identity nor 
does it necessarily diminish the cultural value of the vote. At the same time, the adoption of the 
practice may not be part of a robust regime of immigrants ’ rights nor is it necessary to promote 
participation by noncitizens. Whether a society adopts alien suffrage, however, does refl ect 
that regime’s particular constitutional values and structures, as well as assumptions about the 
manner and pace at which the body politic ought to incorporate noncitizens. 
 Perhaps the core substantive principle of democracy is that those who are subject to 
the law ought to have a say in its formulation. The franchise serves as the primary 
mechanism for the realization of this consent principle. The right to vote has come to 
defi ne both the practice and the formal status of citizenship the world over. In many 
constitutional democracies, the right to vote is limited to formal citizens and, along 
with the right to remain, represents the chief attribute that gives content to the formal 
concept of citizenship. Therein lies a potential dilemma: the aspirations and realities 
of democracy do not always align. Migration and other transnational practices create 
populations within nation-states that are bound by laws over which they have no 
direct control, producing categories of people differentiated from one another by their 
 *  Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. Email:  cristina.rodriguez@nyu.edu . I am grateful for the excel-











 Noncitizen voting and the extraconstitutional construction of the polity    31 
status before the law. For temporary sojourners, this powerlessness is of little moment. 
But for the millions of people who live and work in societies in which they lack formal 
citizenship and, therefore, the right to vote, the core principle of democracy provides 
no protection from the state. 
 Democracies might solve this problem by extending the right to vote to noncitizens. 
Dozens of democracies around the world, in fact, have taken this step, primarily by 
recognizing voting rights for permanent residents in local elections. 1 In many cases, 
the justifi cation for doing so has been not to enfranchise migrants or noncitizens gen-
erally but, rather, to extend reciprocity to nationals of other states that permit nonciti-
zens to vote. And yet, the practice reveals that formal citizenship, the right to vote, and 
participation in the policy are not coterminous. Much has been written articulating 
the normative claims in favor of noncitizen voting. 2 In this essay, I explore instead the 
factors that contribute to a community’s decision actually to extend the franchise, 3 
the implications of the practice for our understanding of how democratic societies 
conceptualize the relationship between citizenship and voting, and what the practice 
tells us about the tools democratic societies use to construct their polities. 
 In most democratic settings, the national constitution or other framework, consti-
tutive documents of the nation-state do not fully determine the size and scope of the 
polity, even when those documents contain voting eligibility rules. Instead, the polity 
is constructed, dynamically, through contestation in the political process, with occa-
sional involvement by courts. The decision not to extend alien suffrage does not mean 
that a society does not consider noncitizens to be part of the polity, while the decision 
to grant alien suffrage is not necessarily incompatible with an exclusive conception 
of the polity. Whether a society chooses to adopt some form of alien suffrage as the 
 1  In this essay, unless otherwise specifi ed, when I invoke noncitizen voting, I refer to voting by permanent 
residents. 
 2  For a discussion of this literature and an argument that the lack of voting rights for noncitizens weakens 
the political power that certain groups ought to have, see Cristina M. Rodríguez,  From Litigation, Legisla-
tion , 117 Y ALE L.J. 1132, 1173 – 78 (2008). 
 3  David Earnest has conducted the most comprehensive empirical analysis of alien suffrage, and his work 
has shown that the national culture of specifi c settings, particularly the extent to which a society con-
ceives of itself as a multiethnic union, rather than pressure from an international or transnational hu-
man rights regime, has determined willingness to extend the franchise. In an extremely helpful typology, 
he identifi es four different nationalist and three different transnationalist explanations scholars have ad-
vanced for why nation-states adopt particular strategies for incorporating noncitizens into their political 
life, including alien suffrage.  See David C. Earnest,  Neither Citizen Nor Stranger: Why States Enfranchise 
Resident Aliens , 58 W ORLD P OL . 242 (2006) (reviewing the extensive literature explaining why societies 
choose particular strategies to incorporate noncitizens). The nationalist points of view explain that the 
decision to extend political rights is a function of: a society’s historical understanding of how the nation 
has been constituted,  id. at 248; the state’s institutions,  id. at 249 – 250; a trade-off for ensuring that 
more expensive social and economic rights not be granted to noncitizens,  id. at 250; and, fi nally, the 
political parties in power, where either left- or right-of-center parties are more likely to enfranchise or 
extend rights to noncitizens,  id. at 251. The transnationalist explanations include that international hu-
man rights norms and international governmental organizations pressure states into adopting incorpo-
rationist practices,  see id. at 253 – 254, and that, in some cases, resident aliens  “ organize across borders ” 
ensuring that in settings where migrants come from geographically proximate countries, the pressure to 
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particular means of accounting for the interests of noncitizens will be a function, ulti-
mately, of the nation-state’s constitutional culture, in two senses of the term. Both the 
values and structures that frame constitutional debates — particularly with respect to 
citizenship as a practice — and the laws and policies that literally defi ne the resident 
population, shape the decision whether to give formal voice to noncitizen residents. 
 “ The people, ” therefore, should not be understood as static but, rather, as an ongoing 
project subject to debate. Crucially, these debates happen at multiple levels of deci-
sion making — a factor central to understanding the nature of polity construction and 
identity formation within nation-states. 4 The fact that the question of who has formal 
voice in the polity is left partially to the political process provides a necessary defi -
nitional fl exibility in the democratic setting, particularly during times of heightened 
migration and transnational integration. 
 To explore further how democratic societies defi ne the people, I consider the non-
citizen voting practices of three jurisdictions — the United States, New Zealand, and 
Ireland — each of which is a long-standing democracy, and each of which contains 
large populations of noncitizens as the result of recent migration. 5 These jurisdictions 
occupy three points along the alien suffrage spectrum, from limited local rights to uni-
versal national rights, thus illuminating the various models of construction available. 
Though the United States has a long and rich history of enfranchising noncitizens, the 
practice has nearly disappeared and exists today only in a handful of localities, pursu-
ant to the control of state and local governments. 6 In Ireland, since 1963, all permanent 
residents have had the right to vote in local elections after six months of residence — a 
prerogative extended and protected not by the local governments themselves but by 
the national government. 7 New Zealand has the most robust alien suffrage regime in 
the world, permitting legal permanent residents who have resided in the country for 
at least one year to vote in both national and local elections. 8 To be sure, the fact that 
most alien suffrage rights remain local in nature means that the practice is somewhat 
 4  This defi nition occurs at a high, national level, with broad participation by the people’s representatives, 
because the immigration laws, which determine who will have the legal status necessary to claim the 
right to vote, are formulated largely at the national level. But the process is also often decentralized and 
localized, because subfederal governments and voters are in control of many alien suffrage regimes. 
 5  The alien suffrage guarantees that exist in each of these jurisdictions are also  “ non-discriminatory, ” a 
term used in the literature to describe regimes that do not impose nationality qualifi cations for access 
to the franchise.  See, e.g. , D AVID C. E ARNEST , O LD N ATIONS , N EW V OTERS : N ATIONALISM , T RANSNATIONALISM, AND 
D EMOCRACY IN THE E RA OF G LOBAL M IGRATION 29 (State Univ. of New York Press 2008).  “ Discriminatory ” 
regimes, on the other hand, extend voting rights only to noncitizens of particular nationalities, usually 
for historical reasons that relate to the country’s colonial history.  See id. at 27. Historically, for example, 
the United Kingdom granted voting rights in parliamentary elections to citizens of Commonwealth na-
tions and to the Republic of Ireland, and citizens of Brazil have special voting rights in Portugal.  See id. at 
27 – 28. 
 6  For a detailed history of alien suffrage in the United States, see Gerald Rosberg,  Aliens and the Right to 
Vote , 75 M ICH . L. R EV . 1092, 1093 – 1100 (1977). For a discussion of contemporary efforts to extend the 
franchise to noncitizens in various states in the United States, see R ON H AYDUK , D EMOCRACY FOR ALL : R ESTOR-
ING I MMIGRANT V OTING R IGHTS IN THE U NITED S TATES 15, 15 – 40 (Routledge 2006). 
 7  See E ARNEST ,  supra note 5, at 30. 
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marginal as a feature of the contemporary democratic nation-state. 9 Nonetheless, 
most of these guarantees have emerged since World War II, and the last two decades 
have produced record migration around the globe and increased political integration 
among nation-states, thus justifying scholarly scrutiny of the practice. 
 In section 1, I consider the status of the noncitizen and the role of the vote within 
a democracy in general terms. In section 2, I consider how constitutional history, 
practice, and structure have contributed to the alien suffrage regimes of each society. 
In section 3, I explore how each society’s historical relationship to immigration and 
emigration have infl uenced the scope of noncitizen voting rights. In the process, I con-
sider how the choice to extend the franchise creates unique institutional frameworks 
for immigrant incorporation. 10 Along the way, I consider various questions: Does the 
practice of alien suffrage secure meaningful political power or render aliens part of the 
so-called people? In the absence of alien suffrage, what other mechanisms do societies 
use to broaden the scope of the polity beyond the formal citizenry, and does the avail-
ability of those mechanisms infl uence the suffrage question? In light of the variety of 
alien suffrage practices, is it possible to understand  “ the people ” of a democracy as a 
coherent concept within societies and across societies? 
 1.  Democracy and the noncitizen 
 The practice of alien suffrage raises the question of whether including noncitizens in 
the polity as voters undermines democratic legitimacy. In 1990, in the so-called  For-
eign Voters Case , the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled that the extension 
of voting rights in local elections to noncitizens violated the Basic Law. 11 The Court 
concluded that Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein 12 — subfederal entities that had 
 9  In addition, in the postwar period, a number of states either have considered alien suffrage and declined 
to adopt the practice (France, Japan, Latvia, and subfederal jurisdictions within Switzerland and the Unit-
ed States) or rescinded noncitizen voting guarantees (Australia, Canada, and the United States).  See id. at 
37 – 39. 
 10  See Cristina M. Rodríguez,  The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age , 106 M ICH . L. R EV . 1111, 1122 –
 1126 (2008). 
 11  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 31, 1990, BVerfGE 83, 37 
(F.R.G.),  reprinted in D ONALD P. K OMMERS , T HE C ONSTITUTIONAL J URISPRUDENCE OF THE F EDERAL R EPUBLIC OF G ERMANY 
197 (Duke Univ. Press 1997). In its decision, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that the Basic Law 
could be amended to permit alien suffrage. In December 1992, the Basic Law was, in fact, amended to 
permit nationals of EU member states to vote in county and local elections, in order to comport with the 
Maastricht Treaty requiring local voting rights for all EU citizens in their countries of residence, thus ef-
fectively nullifying the Court’s decision.  See K OMMERS ,  supra at 199. 
 12  The assembly of this German  Land voted to allow resident aliens from Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland to vote in local and district elections in an act of reciprocity — in rec-
ognition that German citizens residing in those states also were permitted to vote in local elections.  See 
Daniel Munro,  Integration Through Participation: Non-Citizen Resident Voting Rights in an Era of Globaliza-
tion , 9 I NT . M IGRATION & I NTEGRATION 42, 68 (2008). A number of noncitizen voting regimes are based on 
this sort of principle of reciprocity. Still others refl ect the decision by a former colonial power to permit 
citizens of former colonies to have status as electors. Portugal, for example, grants citizens of Brazil resid-
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chosen to enfranchise noncitizens — had undermined the right of the German people 
to self-determination. Voting, the court reasoned, amounted to a direct exercise of the 
state authority possessed by the people, and the enfranchisement of noncitizens per-
mitted individuals who were not a part of the German people to exercise that author-
ity, thus fracturing the cohesive and unifi ed polity necessary for self-government. The 
implication was that the polity could not be separated into national and local constitu-
encies. The concept of the people is singular in the Basic Law, providing a uniform basis 
for  “ democratic legitimation ” at all levels of government. 13 The body politic, because it 
wields state authority, is determined by formal and national citizenship. 
 In interpreting the Basic Law to defi ne the polity in this way, the German Court 
indirectly challenged an important assumption that underlies certain concepts of 
democracy — that representative democracy requires  “ complete congruence ” between 
rights holders and those subject to the authority of the state. 14 The Court implicitly 
rejected the notion that a democracy defi cit exists when noncitizens governed by the 
state have no voice in the formulation of the law, or at least it found that the Basic Law 
contemplated reciprocity between the state and the people when defi ned legally (and 
perhaps culturally), but not sociologically or with reference to the actual territorial pop-
ulation of permanent and quasi-permanent members. 15 In so doing, the Court made 
plain — by the implication of its reasoning, not explicitly — that the consent principle 
on which democracy is based is something of a fi ction. 
 The assumption that the  “ democratic people ” and, therefore, the electorate can consist 
only of those admitted to citizenship is by no means universal. The German Court itself 
recognized the possibility that the Basic Law could be amended. By one estimate, forty-fi ve 
democracies around the world have extended the franchise to noncitizens in some form or 
another. 16 The German Court’s interpretation of the polity thus occupies an outer position 
on a spectrum defi ning who counts as the people eligible to exert state authority through 
the mechanism of the vote. Those nations that have adopted the practice of alien suffrage 
defi ne their polities and conceptualize voting differently, contemplating both the exist-
ence of varied defi nitions of the people and distinct sources for democratic legitimation. 
Though the suffrage guarantees in many of these jurisdictions are nominal, insignifi cant, 
or encumbered by procedural or legal requirements, in many others, the guarantees are 
substantial and even include the right of noncitizens to stand for offi ce. Four societies have 
granted universal suffrage to noncitizens at the national level, 17 leading many scholars 
 13  See K OMMERS ,  supra note 11, at 198 – 199. 
 14  Id. at 198. 
 15  For an excellent analysis of the Court’s opinion and a discussion of the alien suffrage movement in Germany 
written in the immediate aftermath of the Court’s decision, see Gerald L. Neuman,  We Are the People: Alien 
Suffrage in German and American Perspective , 13 M ICH . J. I NT’L . L. 259 (1991 – 1992). Neuman argues, among 
other things, that the German Court’s conceptualization of the polity refl ects a particular conception of na-
tionhood formed in the nineteenth century when  “ linguistic and cultural nationalism  . . . led to an emphasis 
on nationality rather than residence as a crucial factor in defi ning a polity. ”  Id. at 291. 
 16  See Rainer Bauböck,  Expansive Citizenship — Voting Beyond Territory and Membership , 38 PS: P OL . S CI . & 
P OL. 683 – 687 (2005). 
 17  Chile, Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay permit noncitizens to vote, after a period of permanent resi-










 Noncitizen voting and the extraconstitutional construction of the polity    35 
to characterize alien suffrage as an  “ emerging norm of democratic practice, ” 18 even as 
the reasons states have adopted the practice vary considerably from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. 
 However, before exploring why and how this norm of democratic practice has 
emerged in particular contexts, it is important to understand the limitations of using 
alien suffrage as the lens through which to measure whether a society lives up to its 
democratic aspirations as well as to understand how democratic societies construct 
their polities. With respect to the fi rst problem, it may be of little moment that popula-
tions on the periphery of the polity exist. Migration is timeless, which means that such 
populations always have existed and always will exist. It may be suffi cient that a dem-
ocratic regime guarantee all people subject to its jurisdiction the treatment required 
by the basic principles of due process; however, that obligation need not extend to 
giving noncitizens affected by the law meaningful infl uence over its formulation, 
whether through voting rights or other mechanisms. Any theory of democracy must 
identify who is suffi ciently invested and acculturated into a society to warrant being 
part of the people — a line-drawing exercise that inevitably will exclude some individu-
als governed by a society’s laws. Even if democratic legitimacy does not preclude alien 
suffrage, it may not require it, and the practice may tell us little about the nature of 
any given polity. 
 With respect to the second problem — how polities construct themselves — suffrage 
is by no means the only mechanism for inclusion in a society and in its participatory 
dynamics, and so an understanding of who the people are requires a broader scope. 
Moreover, alien suffrage as it is practiced today may not, in actual fact, refl ect the 
meaningful incorporation of noncitizens into the polity. Many existing guarantees 
are limited — only three democracies permit noncitizens to vote in national elections. 
Rates of noncitizen turnout in those societies where suffrage does exist are lower than 
citizen turnout. 19 Most important, those nations that do extend voting rights to non-
citizens tend to limit those rights to permanent residents, although millions of people 
reside outside of their countries of citizenship for extended periods of time and without 
permanent legal status. In other words, between the tourist and the lawful permanent 
resident, there are millions of other quasi members living in democratic societies, and 
a growing range of legal statuses defi ne the terms of their presence. In Ireland, for 
example, an increased reliance on temporary workers who do not have access to the 
local voting rights afforded to permanent residents limits the extent to which non-
citizens resident in Ireland may become part of the polity. 20 Access to the franchise 
 18  I d. at 21. 
 19  See Munro,  supra note 12, at 77 – 78 (citing lower socioeconomic status and lack of offi cial-language mas-
tery of noncitizens as the primary explanations for lower voter turnout). 
 20  Cf. J. M. Mancini & Graham Finlay,  “ Citizenship Matters ” : Lessons from the Irish Citizenship Referendum , 
60 A MER . Q UART . 575, 585 (2008) (noting that the rise of the temporary work system in Ireland and the 
proscription of birthright citizenship for children of nonpermanent residents, will lead to emergence of 
two classes of noncitizens and workers — one with full social and economic benefi ts and one with  “ mini-
mal recourse to even basic protections ” ). The United States, similarly, has become increasingly reliant on 
temporary and undocumented immigrants, who are not eligible for naturalization under current law, to 
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ultimately can be manipulated by changing the formalities of who is admitted and 
how. It is not enough to identify the availability of the vote for permanent resident 
noncitizens to determine how broadly the polity is defi ned, because it matters just as 
much who has the formal legal status that makes the franchise possible. Addressing 
this particular dynamic is beyond the scope of the essay, but it should be fi rmly kept in 
mind as background to the analysis that follows. 21 
 Consideration of the suffrage question should be useful, nonetheless, despite these 
limitations. By considering the practice from the perspective I have outlined, I hope 
to move the debate regarding noncitizen suffrage beyond calls for its implementation, 
on the one hand, and rejection of the practice as dilutive of the value of citizenship, on 
the other, toward a broader discussion of the mechanisms available for shaping the 
size and character of the polity in a way that accounts for the interests of those who 
reside within it. 
 2.  Constitutional values and alien suffrage 
 At its core, the practice of alien suffrage recognizes that certain noncitizens have 
claims to participation in the polity — either because they have interests they are enti-
tled to defend against the state and in relation to fellow members or because certain 
noncitizens constitute de facto members of society entitled to participate directly in 
the formulation of the law. Assuming that the three societies under consideration rec-
ognize the legitimacy of at least some noncitizen demands on the polity, why do they 
adopt widely divergent approaches to the suffrage question? Why is the practice virtu-
ally nonexistent in the United States but robust and permitted at the national level in 
New Zealand? 
 I do not purport to offer anything approximating a complete answer here, if only 
because a comprehensive explanation likely will be historically and culturally contin-
gent. Nonetheless, I argue that whether and  how a society permits alien suffrage ulti-
mately refl ect the pace at which that society believes full incorporation of new members 
ought to occur. At least two factors infl uence whether suffrage serves as a mechanism for 
acknowledging noncitizen membership in the polity. In this section, I consider the role 
played by constitutional culture and structure. I reserve for section 3 the consideration of 
how a society’s historical and evolving relationship to migration shape the practice. 
 In the United States, the limited salience of citizenship as a constitutional concept, 
combined with the federalist structure of the polity, has shaped the trajectory of alien 
suffrage. From the late nineteenth through the twentieth centuries, courts gradually 
acknowledged that important provisions of the Constitution applied to noncitizens, 
protecting them from arbitrary discrimination by states via application of the equal 
 21  One possible solution to this bureaucratic  “ end run ” around the extension of the franchise to persons 
with a meaningful stake in the society is to grant automatic voting rights or naturalization to anyone, 
regardless of status, after a certain number of years of residence.  See R UTH R UBIO-MARÍN , I MMIGRATION AS 
D EMOCRATIC C HALLENGE : C ITIZENSHIP AND I NCLUSION IN THE U NITED S TATES AND G ERMANY (Cambridge Univ. Press 
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protection clause 22 and ensuring them a voice in the political debate by extending 
First Amendment free speech and association protections, 23 albeit ones limited by 
the government’s power to deport. As Alexander Bickel famously argued, we  “ live 
under a Constitution to which the concept of citizenship matters very little ” and that 
 “ prescribes decencies and wise modalities of government quite without regard to the 
concept of citizenship. ” 24 Even defi nitions of the people that draw clear distinctions 
between citizens and noncitizens recognize that the people as a whole encompasses 
more than just citizens. In  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez , for example, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted that  “ the people ” represents a term of art used throughout the 
Constitution to refer  “ to a class of persons who are part of a national community or 
who have otherwise developed suffi cient connection with this country to be consid-
ered part of that community. ” In other words,  “ the people ” is not limited to citizens 
but, rather, includes persons with some sort of property or presence in the United 
States. 25 
 These developments have made any perceived need for alien suffrage less salient 
over time. In fact, they are of a piece with and help to explain the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that individual states can, but need not, exclude aliens from voting. 
Recognizing the state’s interests qua states, the Court has left the ultimate deci-
sion, with respect to the extension of political rights, to the decentralized political 
 22  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (establishing that the equal protection clause applies to per-
sons, not just citizens, and emphasizing that the right to the fruits of one’s labor is protected regardless of 
citizenship, in the process of declaring San Francisco’s denial of permits to operate laundries to Chinese 
residents a violation of the equal protection clause);  see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) 
(striking down Arizona law denying noncitizens access to welfare benefi ts on the ground that noncitizens 
were entitled to heightened protection under the equal protection clause and that the state’s interest in 
saving money by reserving social service expenditures for its own citizens was not compelling); Zadvydas 
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (noting that due process protections apply to noncitizens). 
 23  Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 – 162 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (noting that the First and 
Fifth Amendments  “ extend their inalienable privileges to all persons and guard against any encroach-
ment on those rights by federal or state authority ” ). T. H. Marshall elaborated the now-classic paradigm 
followed by states in their extension of various types of rights to the people — a process he argued oc-
curred in parallel to the development of the modern state itself: states moved from extending various civil 
rights, to protecting political rights, which ultimately enabled rights holders to demand for themselves 
social and economic rights.  See T. H. M ARSHALL , C LASS , C ITIZENSHIP AND S OCIAL D EVELOPMENT : E SSAYS, WITH AN 
I NTRODUCTION BY S EYMOUR M ARTIN L IPSET (Doubleday 1964). As David Earnest, among other scholars, has 
pointed out,  “ noncitizens have won their rights in a reversed sequence. ” For noncitizens, the protection 
of civil rights has been followed by the extension of social and economic rights, both in the United States 
and Europe, though in the U.S., those rights at the federal level have been more precarious. The political 
rights of voting and offi ceholding, by contrast, represent the fi nal stage of evolution.  See Earnest,  supra 
note 3, at 245. 
 24  A LEXANDER B ICKEL, THE M ORALITY OF C ONSENT 53 – 54 (Yale Univ. Press 1975). Peter Schuck has argued that 
the  “ marginal benefi ts to most aliens of moving from legal resident status to full membership are slight ” 
and that  “ the right to vote is probably unimportant to most aliens. ” Peter Schuck,  Membership in the 
Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship ,  in I MMIGRATION AND THE P OLITICS OF C ITIZENSHIP IN E UROPE 
AND N ORTH A MERICA 58 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989). 
 25  See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, 
which protects the  “ right of the people ” to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, did not apply 
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process. 26 The same courts that played a major role in the incorporation of nonci-
tizens into the democratic fold through the extension of speech and equality rights 
have not taken the initiative to extend political rights. 27 In so doing, the courts, 
simultaneously, have secured for noncitizens constitutional stature and defi ned 
voting rights as the core feature of the principle of self-government, which can 
only be realized by the citizen core of the polity and those whom citizens choose to 
include. In contrast to the Irish model discussed in more detail below, then, sub-
national governments in the United States exert powerful control over the pace of 
political incorporation, including by controlling whether  local governments may 
extend the franchise. 
 The question then becomes: Why has the political process in the United States not 
produced a robust, modern-day alien suffrage regime? In general, the states have been 
reluctant in the post – World War II era to enfranchise noncitizens. In some cases, they 
even have prevented local governments from adopting alien suffrage. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, for example, has fi led home-rule petitions with the state on a regular 
basis, seeking the necessary authorization to extend voting rights to noncitizens in 
local election, but has been rebuffed consistently. 28 
 Leaving aside the historical factors discussed in section 3, the Court in  Cabell v. 
Chavez-Salido provides one explanation. In the process of recognizing state authority 
over the suffrage question, the Supreme Court actually articulated the justifi cation for 
exclusion. Its analysis refl ects ideas deeply rooted in U.S. conceptions of popular sover-
eignty that might operate at the state level as much as at the national level: 
 The exclusion of aliens from basic democratic processes is not a defi ciency in the democratic 
system but a necessary consequence of the community’s process of political self-defi nition. Self-
government, whether direct or through representatives, begins by defi ning the scope of the 
community of the governed and thus of the governors as well: Aliens are by defi nition those 
outside of this community. 29 
 Alternatively, states may have abandoned alien suffrage over time because it became 
less salient as a means of protecting noncitizens from the state, precisely because of the 
 26  Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 – 40 (1982).  See Neuman,  supra note 15, at 292 (noting that 
article I of the Constitution, which provides that members of the House of Representatives shall be  “ cho-
sen every second Year by the People of the several States ” could be interpreted to prohibit alien suffrage, 
as could the references to the  “ People ” in the Preamble and the Tenth Amendment, but that it appears to 
be settled that alien suffrage is  “ neither constitutionally compelled nor constitutionally forbidden ” ). 
 27  E ARNEST ,  supra note 5, at 96 (noting that states in which courts have assertively extended civil and social 
protections to noncitizens have been less likely to extend voting rights to the same populations than 
states with less  “ activist ” judiciaries, thus disproving the assumption made by some scholars that voting 
rights are likely to be the product of activist judiciaries). He explores this fi nding with relation to case 
studies of Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.  See id. at 111 – 125. 
 28  See Michael Castagna et al., Securing Non-Citizen Voting Rights: Determining the Feasibility of 
Enabling Legislation in Massachusetts 1 – 2 (2005),  available at  http :// ase . tufts . edu / uep / Degrees /
 fi eld_project_reports / 2005 / 4 - securing_noncitizen_voting_rights . pdf . For an extended account of recent 
local noncitizen voting initiatives in the U.S., see H AYDUK ,  supra note 6. 
 29  Chavez-Salido , 454 U.S. at 439 – 440. The Court also notes that  “ judicial incursions in this area may inter-
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court decisions discussed above. Even if some mechanism for making the state respon-
sive to the interests of noncitizens is required by democracy, the Court has provided 
the states with viable options by guaranteeing free speech and association rights, 
which themselves could enable noncitizens to participate in public life and develop 
civic identities. 
 Just as important has been the fact that many states themselves have chosen to lift 
citizenship requirements for civil service employment and extend integration-oriented 
benefi ts to immigrants that are more generous than what the federal baseline requires 
and more targeted than what the federal government, or an activist judiciary, could 
provide. 30 These developments, arguably, have made suffrage an easy protection to 
dismantle, even within a constitutional context that contemplates the incorporation 
of noncitizens. Suffrage simply has been replaced. Today, these other state practices, 
along with the market, provide the context for immigrant integration, equipping new-
comers with the tools to defend their interests in the public sphere. In other words, the 
United States ’ failure to adopt alien suffrage does not tell a complete story about the 
status of noncitizens within the polity. 31 
 Another plausible hypothesis in tension with these conclusions, however, is that 
the judicial innovations described above have rendered the vote the only attribute of 
citizenship that makes the formal legal status distinctive or valuable. As the result of 
constitutional doctrine, few distinctions between citizens and noncitizens exist at the 
state level — precisely where noncitizen voting rights played a role historically. In other 
words, tying voting to citizenship is a way that states (or the federal government at the 
national level) can give meaning to citizenship, either in and of itself or as an incen-
tive for naturalization and, therefore, assimilation. A variation on this claim would 
be to emphasize that voting is particularly valuable or precious. Following both the 
U.S. Court in  Cabell v. Chavez-Salido and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 
voting refl ects the ultimate expression of a distinctive identity and peoplehood — an 
identity that citizens of the states may prize in their capacities as state voters as much 
as in their capacity as national voters. Whereas the rights protections that have been 
elaborated by courts merely restrain the state from arbitrary behavior, voting rights 
give entrance to a core community. For noncitizens to be a part of the fully realized 
 30  For a discussion of these efforts in this decade, see Cristina M. Rodríguez,  The Signifi cance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation 106 M ICH . L. R EV . 567, 581 – 609 (2008) (describing state-based strategies for im-
migrant incorporation);  see also I RENE B LOEMRAAD , B ECOMING A C ITIZEN : I NCORPORATING I MMIGRANTS AND R EFUGEES 
IN THE U NITED S TATES AND C ANADA 10 (Univ. California Press 2006) (noting that citizenship requirements for 
social services, licensing, and employment have been disappearing). 
 31  Compare P ETER S PIRO , B EYOND C ITIZENSHIP : A MERICAN I DENTITY A FTER G LOBALIZATION 18 – 21 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2008) (arguing that we fetishize the right to vote and that other mechanisms, such as ability to donate to 
political parties and the incentive for politicians to pay attention to the interests of future voters, ensure 
that noncitizens have a voice in the political process) with Cristina M. Rodríguez, Book Review, Peter 
Spiro,  Beyond Citizenship: American Identity after Globalization , 103 A M . J. I NT’L . L. 180, 194 – 195 (2009) 
(critiquing the view that formal citizenship status has lost its signifi cance, in part on the ground that lack 










 40   I • CON  8 (2010),  30 – 49 
people, they must go through a more extended process than simply acquiring the 
status of noncitizen. 32 
 In a similar vein, naturalization offers an alternative to the decoupling of suffrage 
from citizenship that takes account of the need to endow citizenship with some mean-
ing. Indeed, in the  Foreign Voters Case , the German Court acknowledged that the leg-
islature retained the authority to redefi ne the body politic by adjusting citizenship 
rules. 33 Naturalization and alien suffrage obviously are not perfect substitutes — the 
former, by defi nition, takes more time and will inevitably leave out more noncitizens 
than alien suffrage. However, because naturalization provides complete access only 
after a period of acculturation, it represents an unremarkable feature of the legal 
regimes of immigrant-receiving societies. Alien suffrage is in tension with the con-
cept of popular sovereignty, because it extends the power to exercise state authority 
through the vote to persons who have not undergone the transition deemed necessary 
to achieve formal recognition of their qualifi cations to be full members of the polity. 
In the United States, a relatively generous naturalization regime thus balances the 
objective of giving those who are governed by the law a voice, on the one hand, with 
the interest in ensuring the acculturation of members of the polity who exercise state 
authority (as opposed to simply being acknowledged as rights bearers), on the other. 
 The U.S. story thus suggests a puzzle: suffrage is, at once, insignifi cant and cen-
tral. It is unnecessary or peripheral as a mechanism for assimilating newcomers and 
ensuring the participation of the broader membership, yet it is central to defi ning the 
core of the polity and giving content to citizenship as a formal status. 
 The example of New Zealand, by contrast, bridges the gap between these two posi-
tions. Suffrage is central to the nation-state’s constitutional identity, and that very cen-
trality justifi es noncitizen voting rights at the national level. In New Zealand, where 
voter registration has been compulsory since 1924, 34 the franchise and its protection 
seem crucial to the nation’s self-conception and have been described as  “ deeply rooted 
in the collective psyche. ” 35 In fact, New Zealand’s identity as a nation-state is inti-
mately tied to its status as a historical, global leader in the expansion of the franchise; 
it led the world, for example, in extending the right to vote to women in 1893. 
 New Zealand also maintains a constitutional self-image as a laboratory for experi-
mentation in the design of the democracy 36 — a theme most recently evidenced by the 
decision in the early 1990s to abandon the British fi rst-past-the-post elections in favor 
 32  This sort of distinction is arguably present in the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The equal protection and 
due process of law guarantees apply to persons, exerting a baseline restraint on arbitrary action by the 
state, whereas the privileges and immunities clause, which was intended as the centerpiece of the Four-
teenth Amendment even though it means little today, makes clear that certain entitlements beyond the 
baseline belong to citizens only. 
 33  See K OMMERS ,  supra note 11, at 198. 
 34  Alan McRobie,  The Electoral System ,  in E SSAYS ON THE C ONSTITUTION 312, 323 (Philip A. Joseph ed., 1995). 
 35  See N EILL A TKINSON , A DVENTURES IN D EMOCRACY : A H ISTORY OF THE V OTE IN N EW Z EALAND 10 (Univ. Otago Press 
2003). 
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of a new system of proportional representation. 37 Scholars of politics in New Zealand 
draw a correlation between these sorts of innovations in defi ning the electorate and 
the principles of openness and egalitarianism crucial to the development of  “ a frontier 
society. ” 38 Scholars also describe the society’s constitutional culture as highly prag-
matic and responsive to changing circumstances. 39 Indeed, the set of rules that defi nes 
the New Zealand electorate is simultaneously enshrined in  “ macro constitutional set-
tlement ” documents and is the product of evolutionary adaptation to a changing pop-
ulation, ultimately refl ecting compromises forged in the political process. 40 
 Thus, the extension of the franchise in national elections to noncitizens in New Zealand 
hardly seems to refl ect an undervaluing of the vote and, in fact, reinforces the nation’s 
conceptualization of its political culture. This self-image demonstrates both that it is pos-
sible to extend suffrage to noncitizens while treating the vote as quasi-sacred  and that the 
decision to extend the vote to noncitizens has much to do with the way in which the fran-
chise is framed historically. To be sure, the fact that New Zealand extends national voting 
rights to noncitizens does not mean that it has abandoned the self-conscious act of defi n-
ing its political community. The noncitizen voting rule does not create a universal polity; 
it merely pushes the decision about whom to include to the point at which the immigra-
tion laws are made, rather than placing it at the point of screening for citizenship. An 
explanation for why two societies that valorize the vote take nearly opposite approaches 
to noncitizen suffrage thus defi es abstraction from historical detail. In other words, what 
distinguishes different democratic regimes in their approach to alien suffrage is not the 
weight or value of the vote within the broader constitutional context but, rather, how a 
particular society determines what makes its political community distinctive. 
 The Irish case, in which the national and local electorates are defi ned according to 
two very different conceptions of the polity, complicates the story further. Since 1963, 
all noncitizens in Ireland have had the right to vote in local elections after six months 
of residency — the most permissive residency requirement in the world. 41 Though 
these rights are local in nature, they are guaranteed by the national government and, 
therefore, apply throughout the country, regardless of the noncitizen’s origins. At the 
same time, only Irish and British citizens may vote in national elections. The Irish 
case, thus, refl ects a capacity to distinguish between the national and the local  “ peo-
ple. ” In fact, the contested path to voting rights for British citizens in national elec-
tions underscores the fact that — even when a close conceptual correlation is drawn 
between the citizenry and national identity — local alien suffrage is possible 42 and 
 37  Id. at 201 – 227 (detailing the history of the adoption of proportional representation, likening the reform 
to the adoption of women’s suffrage, and attributing it to a concern for equality and fairness, a general 
 “ crusade for the moral reform of politics, ” and the machinations of particular individuals and parties). 
 38  McRobie,  supra note 34, at 319. 
 39  See, e.g. , Matthew S. Palmer,  New Zealand Constitutional Culture , 22 N.Z. U NIV . L. R EV . 565, 574 – 576 (2007). 
 40  Elizabeth McLeay,  Evolving Rules in a Parliamentary Democracy , 6 E LECTION L.J. 421, 421 (2007). 
 41  E ARNEST ,  supra note 5, at 30. 
 42  Cf. Neuman,  supra note 15, at 322 – 330 (discussing whether American conceptions of popular sover-
eignty and federalism would preclude voting rights at the state level, concluding that  “ this history of 
federalism supports the view that the Constitution does not make  national citizenship a prerequisite for 
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can exist alongside a constitutional defi nition of the people based on a thick sense of 
national identity. 
 That strong sense of national identity framed the debate over voting rights for Brit-
ish citizens in the early 1980s. In 1984, the Irish Supreme Court heard a challenge 
to a bill that would have granted voting rights to citizens of the U.K. who already 
possessed local rights, in both Dáil (national parliamentary) elections as well as in 
presidential elections and referendums. The move represented an act of reciprocity 
recognizing the rights granted to Irish citizens in the U.K. 43 The Court struck down the 
bill for being inconsistent with the conception of national suffrage that underpinned 
the Irish Constitution. 44 
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court drew a distinction between the article 16 
suffrage guarantee and other constitutional provisions, such as freedom of associa-
tion and expression. Though the Constitution nominally granted the latter rights 
to citizens alone, the courts had interpreted them to apply to noncitizens. The Court 
characterized suffrage as distinct, however, treating it as a framework right different 
in kind from the other sorts of rights. 45 Thus, the Court’s decision insulated the suf-
frage question from the ordinary political process, requiring the people to determine 
the outer limits of the national electorate through constitutional referendum. Just as 
the German Basic Law was amended in the wake of the  Foreign Voters Case , Irish vot-
ers eventually added the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, extending the suf-
frage guarantee to citizens of the U.K. and establishing the state’s authority to extend 
similar rights to citizens of other EU member states that grant national voting rights 
to Irish citizens. 
 This series of events does not explain why Ireland adopted and maintains local alien 
suffrage (a question deferred to section 3). Still, it does suggest that limited national 
suffrage — as distinct from other rights that enable political participation, such as free-
dom of speech — is not inconsistent with local voting rights for noncitizens, a state of 
affairs that would be compatible with the U.S. jurisprudence and practice discussed 
above. Perhaps even more important, this history underscores how quickly the politi-
cal process can reformulate conceptions of national sovereignty in the wake of new 
political and institutional demands. In both the Irish and German cases, the evolution 
of the EU has led to dramatic reformulations of conceptions of popular sovereignty as 
played out through the concept of alien suffrage. 
 The different practices outlined above demonstrate, ultimately, that conclusions 
regarding who belongs in the polity as well as in the electorate are shaped by a com-
bination of constitutional structures, extraconstitutional debates informed by con-
stitutional values, and external political pressures. The interest in defi ning the polity 
 43  See B RYAN F ANNING ET AL ., I RISH P OLITICAL P ARTIES , I MMIGRATION, AND I NTEGRATION IN 2007, at 14 (2007),  avail-
able at  http :// www . law . ed . ac . uk / staff / joshaw / fi les / immigrationandintegrationinparties2007 . pdf  
 44  In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of The Electoral (Amendment) Bill, 1983, 
[1984] I.R. 268 (Ir.),  available at  http :// www . supremecourt . ie / supremecourt / sclibrary3 . nsf /( WebFiles )/ 
3B9009F8586D9528802575F3002DA959 /$ FILE / Electoral1983_ [ 1984 ] IE268 . htm 
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broadly is not inconsistent with defi ning the electorate narrowly, particularly when 
signifi cant constitutional protections are understood to apply without respect to citi-
zenship, as has been the case in the United States. At the same time, a conception of 
suffrage as central to a nation’s constitutional identity is compatible with noncitizen 
voting, where the content of that identity revolves around a particular conception of 
the right to vote. New Zealand’s practices underscore the point that a robust culture 
of voting and electoral innovation is consistent with, even amplifi ed by, alien suffrage. 
But the U.S. and Ireland both demonstrate that the polity can be defi ned differently at 
different levels of government, to accommodate ambivalence about who constitutes 
the people and changing views about how the interests of noncitizens are best taken 
into account in government and politics. 
 3.  Alien suffrage and immigration 
 Implicit in the discussion in section 2 is the conclusion that how a society defi nes its 
polity — who constitutes its people — is related not just to the values and practices that 
have evolved from its political and constitutional frameworks but also to the particu-
lar historical relationship the society has had to immigration. In this part, I consider in 
more detail how a society’s constitutional history in a more literal sense — in the sense 
of how the population is physically defi ned — might infl uence the noncitizen suffrage 
question. 46 
 As David Earnest has shown in his empirical analysis of twenty-four democracies ’ 
alien suffrage policies, noncitizen voting rights tend to be granted in societies that seek 
to construct a polity without respect to ancestry. Whether a country adopts alien suf-
frage has less to do with whether it has become postnational than with certain states ’ 
long-standing conception of nationhood as either multiethnic or ethnoculturally 
defi ned. 47 The nation-states that have enfranchised noncitizens have been historically 
 “ assimilationist, ” 48 in the sense that they have sought to turn immigrants into citizens 
instead of treating immigration as anathema in order to maintain an ethnically and 
culturally defi ned conception of the polity. States with jus soli citizenship rules, which 
arguably refl ect great openness to incorporating newcomers regardless of ancestry, 
have been more likely to extend suffrage to noncitizens than states with a jus sanguinis 
citizenship rule, where citizenship is determined by bloodline, 49 though not necessar-
ily ethnically. Relatedly, countries in which the rights of national minorities and the 
allocation of power among existing  “ indigenous ” ethnic or linguistic groups inform 
the political struggles, such as Belgium, have taken longer to enfranchise noncitizens 
 46  For a sweeping account of how the United States has used its immigration and citizenship laws to con-
struct itself as a nation, see A RISTIDE Z OLBERG , A N ATION BY D ESIGN : I MMIGRATION P OLICY IN THE F ASHIONING OF 
A MERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 2006). 
 47  E ARNEST ,  supra note 5, at 141 – 142. 
 48  Id. at 142. 
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than their nonethnically divided counterparts. 50 Presumably these differences result 
from the absence of consensus within the citizenry about whether culture ought to 
defi ne who the people are. 
 And yet, the United States (along with Canada and Australia, which have rescinded 
alien suffrage guarantees in the postwar period) 51 and New Zealand — the classic 
immigrant, multiethnic, jus soli democracies — stand at opposite ends of the immi-
grant suffrage spectrum. This fact reinforces the simple and unsurprising conclusion 
that the particular practices a society adopts to mediate the competing concerns of 
democratic accountability, sovereignty, and immigrant incorporation refl ect the soci-
ety’s own history. Nonetheless, reviewing the particular immigrant contexts of each 
of the three regimes under consideration will help illuminate the relationship between 
immigration and polity defi nition. 
 In the United States, noncitizen suffrage played an important role, historically, in 
the construction of the polity by helping to settle the territories 52 and attract immi-
grants to build the human capital of a country with aspirations of thriving from coast 
to coast. To the extent that noncitizen suffrage operated as an incentive for settlement, 
then, it necessarily faded as a practice as territories became states, as the nation’s pop-
ulation reached a size that meant frontier settlement was no longer a high priority, 53 
and as changing demographics led to growing skepticism regarding immigration. 54 
The consequence of this shift has been a redefi nition of the mechanisms of immigrant 
incorporation. As Irene Bloemraad has emphasized, scholars, politicians, and voters 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries — the eras when noncitizen vot-
ing was common — believed that participatory activity by immigrants mattered to the 
health of the larger society. 55 Whereas political parties and unions, along with ethnic 
associations and religious organizations, played a major role, historically, in involv-
ing new immigrants in larger social and political processes, 56 today it is primarily the 
 50  Id. at 120 – 124. It should be noted, however, that New Zealand is self-consciously bicultural, given the 
place the indigenous Maori population occupies in the society’s politics. 
 51  See supra note 9 . 
 52  See Rosberg,  supra note 6, at 1096 – 98; Neuman,  supra note 15, at 295, 299 (noting the practice of alien 
suffrage in various territories and its continuation after those territories became states).  Cf. Cristina M. 
Rodríguez,  Clearing the Smoke-Filled Room: Women Jurors and the Disruption of an Old-Boys ’ Network in 
Nineteenth-Century America , 108 Y ALE L.J. 1805 (1999) (noting that the granting to women of political 
rights such as voting and the right to sit on juries in the territories of Washington and Wyoming was 
considered a means of attracting women to the Western territories). 
 53  Neuman,  supra note 15, at 299. 
 54  Jamin Raskin has advanced a different historical argument for the disappearance of alien suffrage, con-
tending that suffrage has always been exclusive in some way in U.S. history. Whereas race, gender, prop-
erty, and wealth used to serve as bases for exclusion, today citizenship status performs that role.  See Jamin 
Raskin,  Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage , 
141 U. P ENN . L. R EV . 1391, 1395 (1993). 
 55  B LOEMRAAD ,  supra note 30, at 247;  see also H IROSHI M OTOMURA , A MERICANS IN W AITING : T HE L OST S TORY OF 
I MMIGRATION AND C ITIZENSHIP IN THE U NITED S TATES (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (discussing a forgotten tradition of 
treating immigrants as citizens-in-waiting, entitled to access to the same rights and privileges as citizens). 
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market and, secondarily, the occasional state-sponsored integration programs that 
serve as the engines of incorporation. 
 New Zealand certainly conceives of itself, like the United States, as a nation of immi-
grants. Immigration has constituted the population since the nineteenth century, and 
 “ net migration gains ” have reached record levels in this decade. 57 However, the adop-
tion of noncitizen voting was a function of this history only in the narrowest sense. 
It resulted from the protracted process by which New Zealand came into its full inde-
pendence from Britain. Until 1975, the law required electors to be  “ British subjects ” 
and resident in New Zealand for a certain period. The 1975 Electoral Act removed the 
former requirement and left only the latter in place, making residency the only eligibil-
ity requirement for voting. 58 
 More signifi cant than its origins, however, is the fact that the practice of noncitizen vot-
ing remains intact today. Citizenship has never been added to the eligibility requirements, 
despite the fact the electoral laws have been amended multiple times, and despite the fact 
that the major sources of immigration (from European to Asian) have changed consid-
erably in recent decades. Noncitizen voting, in other words, has become an entrenched 
universal norm rather than a function of the country’s British heritage. What is more, 
as a practice, it is at once widely accepted and little remarked upon; the abundant schol-
arly literature on voting in New Zealand barely notes the existence of alien suffrage, and 
the merits of the practice are largely absent from political debate. Any number of factors 
could explain this lack of attention, including the possibility that New Zealand’s concep-
tion of itself as an immigrant-receiving society, which also encourages the broadest par-
ticipation possible, accommodates the practice easily; 59 that the practice has had a limited 
impact on the nature of the polity; or that lawmakers and politicians acknowledge the 
potential benefi ts that fl ow from it, such as promoting immigrant integration. 60 
 Regardless of the importance assigned by citizens or scholars of New Zealand to non-
citizen voting, the existence of alien suffrage in national elections ultimately means 
that the immigration laws, rather than the citizenship laws, largely defi ne the people 
of New Zealand. The fact that nearly 20 percent of the population of New Zealand 
is foreign-born means that the polity is remarkably heterogeneous as well as  “ new. ” 
Since 1990, in particular, immigration from Asia has risen sharply, further diversi-
fying the population and engendering some ambivalence but no apparent retrench-
ment with respect to future immigration fl ows. 61 
 57  See Richard Bedford,  New Zealand: The Politicization of Immigration (2003),  available at  http :// www .
 migrationinformation . org / Profi les / display . cfm ? ID  =  86. 
 58  For a discussion of this history, see Elizabeth McLeay,  Democratic Experiments in New Zealand , Dept. of 
Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Parliament House 93 (2005),  available at  http :// www . aph . gov . au /
 senate / pubs / pops / pop44 / mcleay . pdf . 
 59  See McLeay,  supra note 40, at 423 (noting wide participation as a value but acknowledging that more 
scholarly attention should be given to understanding New Zealand’s unusual alien suffrage practice 
within that context). 
 60  See R EPORT OF THE R OYAL C OMMISSION ON THE E LECTORAL S YSTEM § 9.5 (1986),  available at  http :// www .
 elections . org . nz / voting / mmp / royal - commission - report - 1986 . html . 
 61  See Bedford,  supra note 57. In 2002, approximately 54 percent of new immigration approvals were of 
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 At the same time, New Zealand’s immigration policy selects for a very particular 
type of immigrant. In 2002, for example, the government raised the level of English-
language competence required for entry; the selection system, as a whole, is  “ biased ” 
toward immigrants with substantial educational and professional qualifi cations in 
a deliberate effort to screen for immigrants who will contribute to social cohesion. 62 
Though its defi nition of the polity does not seem in any sense culturally defi ned, 
through its immigration laws New Zealand does control the channels to universal 
suffrage by prioritizing the selection of immigrants it considers to be compatible with 
its national ethos of promoting prosperity as well as  “ biculturalism within a context of 
increasing ethnic and cultural diversity. ” 63 
 The fact that suffrage rights in the U.S. have contracted to apply almost exclusively 
to an inner core of the polity thus does not seem different in kind from the tools used by 
New Zealand, which enfranchises noncitizens but nonetheless screens them for their 
compatibility with New Zealand political culture in the construction of the electorate 
through the immigration laws. Indeed, the fact that U.S. immigration law does not 
select in any rigorous fashion for skills or assimilability but focuses predominantly, 
instead, on family ties may well refl ect a much more diverse conception of the polity. 
 Ireland has only recently become an immigrant-receiving society as the result of 
its late twentieth-century economic transformation. Even more so than those of New 
Zealand, its alien suffrage practices predate mass immigration, particularly from out-
side Europe, and cannot be described as having been designed to correct any sort of 
democracy defect engendered by global migration. Instead, the practice was adopted 
as a matter of reciprocity toward the British, as Irish citizens had been permitted to 
vote in local British elections since 1948. 64 Commentators also have traced the origins 
of local noncitizen voting to the desire to  “ show up ” Northern Ireland, which denied 
Catholics the right to vote at the time, by emphasizing residency as the criterion for 
local voting rights, rather than religion or nationality. 65 
 That said, the practice of alien suffrage has been justifi ed in light of Ireland’s new 
status as an immigrant-receiving society. Political actors within Ireland have empha-
sized that the past Irish experience with  emigration engenders something of a sense 
of obligation within Ireland to integrate today’s immigrants. Moreover, the practice 
persists today and seems well entrenched (though also underutilized), 66 despite grow-
ing ambivalence over the sharp rise in immigration and increasing distrust of asylum 
seekers. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  See 56 S EANAD D EB . Col. 1067 (Jul. 10, 1963) ( “ I wonder whether it is not a matter of justice that we 
should treat British residents in this country on similar terms . . . . In my view the British acted with 
considerable generosity after 1948 in the matter of giving citizenship to our people ” ). Debates in the Irish 
Seanad also suggest that some lawmakers were motivated by the fact that  “ British citizens living here 
contribute to taxes and to rates. They perform jury service. They contribute in every way as citizens, but 
they are restricted from voting. ”  See 56 S EANAD D EB . Col. 1069 (Jul. 10, 1963). 
 65  Alexandra Starr,  Ireland Transformed , S LATE , Oct. 16, 2008,  http :// www . slate . com / toolbar . aspx ? action + 
print & id  =  2201909 . 
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 In 2004, that ambivalence came to the fore in dramatic fashion, when 80 percent 
of the national Irish electorate voted to end the extension of jus soli citizenship to the 
children of all immigrants, limiting Ireland’s once universal birthright citizenship rule 
to children born of at least one Irish citizen parent, or of one parent entitled to be a 
citizen. This outcome has been attributed to escalating concern that the universal jus 
soli guarantee was being abused by asylum claimants entering Ireland to give birth 
to Irish children. 67 But it is also of a piece with the retrenchment in recent years of 
immigrants ’ rights, along with a political discourse of increased demonization and 
categorization of the asylum seeker. 68 
 The fact that local noncitizen suffrage remains secure, despite the political move-
ment that resulted in the citizenship referendum, might seem curious at fi rst glance. 
The referendum might have refl ected Irish voters ’ desire to control immigrants ’ access 
to the full rights of citizenship by preventing migrants not eligible for citizenship from 
forcing new members — their children — into the polity. But this desire for control over 
the citizenry was not accompanied by calls for restrictions on immigration, 69 nor 
was a defense of  “ Irishness ” a part of the offi cial campaign. 70 The political movement 
behind the referendum thus appears to have been compatible with a limited recogni-
tion of suffrage rights for those admitted to permanent residence, particularly at the 
local level. The referendum brings into relief the fact that local voting does not solidify 
a permanent relationship between immigrants and the body politic in the same way 
that citizenship rules do. 
 The fact that the referendum did not bring to the surface criticism of noncitizen 
suffrage might also be suggestive of the limited role the practice, particularly at the 
local level, plays in bringing immigrants into the polity. Research from Europe and 
Ireland lends support to this view. A recent report studying the extent to which politi-
cal parties have succeeded in promoting immigrant integration in Ireland found that, 
although efforts have been made to encourage immigrants entitled to vote to regis-
ter, many immigrants do not realize they are entitled to vote, and government out-
reach to voters has been thin. 71 Furthermore, the mere existence of the franchise is 
 67  See Starr,  supra note 65;  see also John A. Harrington,  Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-nationalist Ire-
land , 32 J. L. & S OC’Y . 424, 443 – 445 (2005) (detailing government arguments in defense of the referen-
dum, including the claim that citizenship  “ tourism ” was burdening the health care system). 
 68  See Bryan Fanning,  Racism, rules and rights , in I MMIGRATION AND s OCIAL CHANGE IN THE R EPUBLIC OF I RELAND 6, 
17 – 21 (Bryan Fanning ed., Manchester Univ. Press 2007). 
 69  One assessment of the referendum as compatible with open immigration policy emphasizes Ireland’s in-
creased reliance on temporary workers, suggesting that the citizenship referendum represents a means 
of continuing immigration while policing entry into citizenship in a way that facilitates the emergence of 
two workforces, or two classes of membership.  See also Mancini & Finley,  supra note 20, at 585. 
 70  See Harrington,  supra note 67, at 447. 
 71  B RYAN F ANNING , N EIL O’B OYLE & J O S HAW , N EW I RISH P OLITICS : P OLITICAL P ARTIES AND I MMIGRANTS IN 2009 (2009), 
 available at  http :// www . ucd . ie / mcri / resources / new_irish_politics_report_fi nal . pdf (drawing this observa-
tion from the reports of immigrant candidates, members of political parties, and individuals active in voter 
registration campaigns claim);  see also Bryan Fanning & Fidele Mutwarasibo,  Nationals/non-nationals: 
Immigration, citizenship and politics in the Republic of Ireland , 30 E THNIC & R ACIAL S TUD . 439, 444 (2007) 
( “ Concerns raised by NGOs months in advance of the election that non-citizen immigrants entitled to vote 
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not suffi cient as a defense mechanism if noncitizens are not able or choose not to take 
advantage of the power it affords them to infl uence the platforms of political parties 
or assume offi ce at the local level, where possessing some state power might translate 
into infl uence at higher levels of government and with the electorate as a whole. The 
same report recommended active promotion of naturalization among members of the 
immigrant community in Ireland, underscoring again that noncitizen suffrage and 
naturalization are far from perfect substitutes. 
 In the end, the most interesting dimension of the alien suffrage story may be not 
whether divergent practices suggest different conceptions of democracy and political 
organization among nation-states, but whether alien suffrage can facilitate immi-
grant incorporation in a way that advances robust participation and social cohe-
sion — a consideration beyond the scope of this essay but worthy of further research. In 
Ireland, the practice of noncitizen voting at the local level transforms political parties 
into potentially powerful agents of acculturation. Though party outreach to nonci-
tizen voters has been limited, it could develop with time, because the incentive for 
parties to cultivate noncitizen interest is built into the structure of the electorate. 72 
Moreover, research from the United States and Canada underscores the importance of 
creating mechanisms for active noncitizen participation in order to ensure immigrant 
integration. These mechanisms need not take the form of voting rights; however, 
something more than relying on networks created by the economy and family seems 
in order. 73 In the United States, even if the political culture does not offer fertile ground 
for the implementation of noncitizen voting, it may still be possible to foster a culture 
of participation. Perhaps the most important conclusion to derive from a considera-
tion of alien suffrage practices, then, is not that the realization of democracy should 
lead states on an inexorable march toward New Zealand – style noncitizen voting but, 
instead, that claiming access to and participation in the polity takes work and recogni-
tion through a variety of state and nonstate mechanisms. 
 Conclusion 
 In New Zealand and Ireland, the practice of noncitizen voting has been well entrenched 
and accepted for decades and does not seem threatened by growing disquiet over rising 
numbers of immigrants. In the United States, by contrast, alien suffrage represents a 
vital but now nearly defunct practice in the nation’s long history of immigrant incor-
poration. The dramatic growth of the immigrant population in the last two decades 
may yet give rise to more examples of noncitizen voting in the U.S., but it necessarily 
will be piecemeal because of the structure of the states ’ control over the franchise. 
 Explaining these differences is as easy and as diffi cult as pointing to three differ-
ent systems rooted in similar principles of popular sovereignty mediated through 
 72  For studies of efforts by Irish political parties to reach out to noncitizens, see F ANNING, ET AL .,  supra note 43; 
F ANNING , O’B OYLE & S HAW ,  supra note 71. 
 73  See B LOEMRAAD ,  supra note 30, at 251 (emphasizing that political incorporation works better when  “ gov-
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demonstrably different constitutional structures and histories. It may be possible 
to identify, broadly, the political and cultural characteristics that lead democratic 
societies to adopt alien suffrage. However, among those societies where the practice 
has played a role in the development of the polity, it can be diffi cult to disentangle 
the story from the society’s particular constitutional histories and structures, mak-
ing generalized conclusions about the relationship between alien suffrage and the 
nature of democracy diffi cult. It is hardly novel to suggest that a society’s decision to 
adopt a particular set of alien suffrage practices refl ects its own political culture. 
 Still, what this sort of study does reveal is that, despite the close alignment drawn 
in theory and practice between the right to vote and the defi nition of the people, the 
political incorporation of noncitizens does not rise and fall on whether the vote has 
been extended. In the end, there are many ways to construct a democratic polity, and 
the process of construction is an ongoing and contested one to which political debates 
and institutions at every level of government contribute. The variety of ways in which 
alien suffrage has been assimilated into the political cultures of democratic societies 
thus underscores a generalizable point — the process of constructing the people 
of a democracy is dynamic and realized through multiple mechanisms of decision 
making. 
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